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‘Rome wasn’t built in a day’:
lobbies, institutions and
speculation in the 1880s
building fever
PAOLO DI MARTINO ∗
Department of Management, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston,
Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
abstract: During the 1880s, a massive speculative boom occurred in the Roman
real estate market. Its subsequent crash left a lasting mark on the structure of the
city and triggered a nationwide banking crisis. This article analyses the causes
of this boom and bust by showing how a small but cohesive lobby managed to
bypass and bend to its own advantage formal regulation by exploiting institutional
conflicts and political divisions at both national and local level.
Introduction
The dream of the men of the Risorgimento to see Rome become the capital
of Italy came true in September 1870, when Italian troops overcame the
almost symbolic resistance of the papal guards and entered the city. It took
the Italian authorities very little time, however, to realize that what the
once-mightywalls were defending held little resemblance to the ‘immortal
city’ imagined by Romantic insurgents; in fact, Rome looked much more
like a ancien regime town than a potential capital of a modern state.
Massive investment in expansion, modernization and refurbishment of
buildings, streets and squares was then badly needed. After a false start in
the early 1870s, by 1879, Rome had been turned into a giant building site,
and by themid-1880s, the entire citywas burningwithwhat contemporary
writers described as an incurable ‘building fever’, with virtually all Italian
banks involved, to some extent, in the business of rebuilding Rome.1
The crash that followed was more sudden, but certainly not less
spectacular.When, at the end of 1887, credit availability started to contract,
all building activity stopped, revealing the speculative nature of the
enterprise and leaving behind massive unemployment, social unrest and
a countless number of semi-finished new buildings and semi-demolished
∗ I wish to thank Francesca Carnevali and Leif Jerram for useful comments and criticisms,
and Kaile Bruce, Roy Edwards and Peter Von Staden for inspiring conversations on the
subject of economic institutions. The usual disclaimers apply.
1 See, amongmany others, L. Ferraris, ‘L’Italia e Roma’,Nuova Antologia, 112 (1890), 290–301.
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old ones. The subsequent sharp decline in the value of land and real
estate, combinedwith problems in the international economy, put growing
pressure on banks and financial institutions. The collapse of the Roman
real estate market thus triggered a series of banking crises in 1887, 1889
and 1893; by January 1894, the biggest Italian banks had failed and Italy
had to abandon the gold standard.2
The boom and subsequent crash of the Roman building sector during
the 1880s is therefore a key element in the shaping of the nineteenth-
century Italian economy, and its explanation a relevant task for historians.
In the 1950s and 1960s, various Italian scholars engaged with this topic,
and provided an explanation that emphasized the conflict between the
private interest of specific groups and virtuous yet insufficient public
regulation.3 Historians writing during this period argued that neither the
national government nor the local council managed to stop or to limit the
alliance between local landowners and north Italian financial institutions,
which turned the modernization of Rome into a personal and highly
speculative business. Although this analysis carefully considered the role
of institutional mechanisms and of their ‘technical’ failures, nonetheless, it
failed to provide more than a story of personal greed and corruption.
Recent studies, however, have provided a different view: unregulated
private initiative, in the absence of any real alternative, is seen with
a more sympathetic eye, and the struggle between private and public
interest is analysed in wider terms of institutional and political conflict.
In a recent book on contemporary Rome, Vidotto reads the story of the
1880s speculation as the natural result of a general lack of disciplined
private intervention framed by a continuous lack of communication, if not
open conflict, between the national government and the Roman council.4
One of the most important consequences of this view is that the events
of the 1880s cannot logically or chronologically be disentangled from the
history of the 1860s and 1870s as during these decades the directions of the
development of the city had been already distorted by a series of private
2 The role of the boom and bust in the Roman building sector in the national crisis of the
1890s is a matter of debate. In the early studies, for example A. Confalonieri, Banca e
industria in Italia (1894–1906), vol. I: Le premesse: dall’abolizione del corso forzoso alla caduta del
Credito Mobiliare (Bologna, 1979), the collapse of the Roman market in 1887 is seen as the
engine of the subsequent banking crises of 1889 and 1893. More recent studies by Fenoaltea
(S. Fenoaltea, ‘International resource flows and construction movements in the Atlantic
economy: the Kuznets cycle in Italy, 1861–1913’, Journal of Economic History, 48 (1988),
605–37; S. Fenoaltea, ‘Notes on the rate of industrial growth in Italy, 1861–1913’, Journal of
EconomicHistory, 63 (2003), 695–735) emphasize instead the role of thewithdrawal of foreign
investment which followed. To my mind, these two interpretations are complementary
rather than mutually exclusive.
3 See, among others, A. Caracciolo, ‘Il comune di Roma fra clericali e liberali nel periodo
crispino (1887–1890)’,Movimento operaio, n.s. 6 (1954), 275–302; A. Caracciolo, Roma capitale.
Dal risorgimento alla crisi dello stato liberale (Rome, 1956); P. Della Seta, ‘La speculazione
edilizia e le sue origini’, in AA.VV., Introduzione a Roma contemporanea. Note e saggi per lo
studio di Roma dal 1870 ad oggi (Rome, 1954); and I. Insolera, Roma moderna. Un secolo di storia
urbanistica, 1870–1970 (Turin, 1962) .
4 Vittorio Vidotto, Roma contemporanea (Rome and Bari, 2001).
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actions responding to conflicting signals coming from different directions.
The work by Ciampani can be seen as the natural complement to Vidotto’s
analysis insofar as it frames the institutional conflicts in the light of the
political struggle between Catholics and liberals, or different wings of both
movements, in the national parliament and in the Roman council.5
The newwave of studies of the development of Rome during the crucial
decades of the 1870s and 1880s thus go beyond the mere conflict between
private and public, to embrace wider issues such as conflict and the
institutional lack of communication, or the role of individuals’ agencywith
regard to more general political constraints and opportunities. A further
question naturally emerges: if the story of the 1880s speculation is the
result of conflict and lack of communication between different institutions
and within individual ones, what exactly determined the outcome of such
frictions and what specific consequences emerged?
This article examines these questions by analysing the dynamic between
the national parliament and the local council, aswell as various branches of
the latter, making the case for a typical example of ‘institutional capture’,
where a well-organized small group of agents exploited in their favour
the weaknesses of the institutional environment and the divisions in the
political front.6 The analysis, however, also considers the impact of some
specific historical accidents and the unpredicted series of lock-in effects
that followed.
The article is structured as follows. The first two sections provide the
necessary background by analysing two waves of speculation which took
place during the 1870s (first section) and the 1880s (second section). The
third to fifth sections analyse the interaction between groups, institutions
and rules by looking at the features and limits of laws passed in the early
1880s by the national parliament (third section), the way these laws were
bypassed in their application in the local context (fourth section) and on
how opposition at local level was silenced or ignored (fifth section). The
sixth section provides some concluding remarks.
The beginning: the 1860s and 1870s
When, in 1870, the Italian army broke into Rome, the city hardly resembled
the glorious caput mundi it had once been. In fact, centuries of economic
and political decline had left deep marks on both the structure and size
of the city, and made it totally unfit to become the capital of the young
and ambitious kingdom of Italy. Major refurbishment, restoration and
enlargement were regarded as urgent priorities. In fact an embryonic
5 See, in particular, A. Ciampani, Cattolici e liberali durante la trasformazione dei partiti. La
‘Questione di Roma’ tra politica nazionale e progetti Vaticani (Rome, 2000).
6 D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990),
andM.Olson,The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge,
MA, 1965).
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process of development had already started during the last decade of
the Vatican administration, and although it had done little in terms of
making the city look more like the capital of a modern state, nonetheless
it left a significant mark on its future expansion. In particular, the
decision in 1867 to centralize train traffic around the Termini station
immediately attracted the attention of speculators to the space adjacent
to it, specifically the Esquilino hill and the area known as Castro Pretorio.7
Thus, before any decision was made by the Italian authority about where
and how to build, economic interests had already focused on certain
areas, creating a pre-existing constraintwhichwould influence subsequent
decisions both at national and local level. Among the most interesting
protagonists of this earlyboomwasFrancescoSaveriodeMerode, aVatican
aristocrat of Belgian origins, who in the early 1870s pioneered a system
of private–public deals (the so-called convenzioni) which were intended
to play a fundamental role in the 1880s development. A convenzione
was designed to ensure that the local council officially recognized the
privatedevelopment of a given area andagreedonprovidingbasic services
in exchange for free land on which to build streets and squares. However,
while in the 1870s convenzioni can be seen as a way of bypassing lack
of planning and public initiative, in the 1880s, they would play a very
different andmuch less virtuous role. During the early 1870s, the trajectory
of development based on the system of the convenzioni started by De
Merode was reinforced by the action of the finance minister Quintino
Sella and his decision about the location of the new building hosting
the ministry headquarters. The early 1870s thus saw the emergence of
development shaped by public action as well as private initiative, but
upon which the local council had little influence, apart from providing
retrospective approval. In fact, in the early 1870s the council tried to be
more proactive and to impose a building plan, but after almost three years’
work, the end result was a generic plan, almost impossible to enforce,
and never rubber-stamped by the national government. Meanwhile, in
addition to public initiatives such as that of Sella and private development
only retrospectively approved via convenzioni, the 1870s also witnessed
formsof expansion that completely ignoredor bypassedofficial regulation.
A typical example is the development of the area on the left-bank of the
river Tiber opposite the Vatican known as Prati di Castello (or simply
Prati), where the building of a new borough was started without any legal
authorization.8 Again, the interests concentrated in the area were going to
play an important role in the subsequent decisions about the development
of the city.
In terms of interests involved, the 1870s saw the emergence of an
alliance between banks based in the north of the country and operating
7 Vidotto, Roma contemporanea, 64.
8 Caracciolo, Roma capitale, 90–104.
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locally via dedicated branches or in connection with local institutions, and
large landowners. Among these, there were Roman aristocrats close to the
Vatican,9 but also the so-called ‘countrymerchants’, a group of rich traders
in agricultural goods who had reinvested part of their earnings in the
purchase of properties formerly belonging to the church and expropriated
and sold by the government after 1870. Despite these policies, however,
the Vatican itself was not at all cut off from the business of the rebuilding of
Rome; behind the fac¸ade of financial institutions such as the Bancodi Roma
or through the action of aristocrats, the Vatican was active in speculating
on land as well as in the expanding sector of utilities and transport.10
By 1873, when the crash of the Vienna stockmarket temporarily drained
financial resources from Rome and building activity was put on hold,
directions of development, business practices and interests were thus
already consolidated. And if shortage of funds momentarily constrained
building activity, this did not mean that discussions about the future of
the city stopped as well. By the end of the decade, the idea of Rome
as a modern industrial centre had been definitely abandoned, but the
concept ofmodernity had survived in the dreamofwide and straight roads
and salubrious buildings taking the place of the narrow lanes and small
houses that still characterized the structure of most of the central areas
of the city. This change in outlook brought about a change of priorities
in terms of directions of constructions; specifically the areas around the
Termini station relatively declined in the interest of speculators, while
the area around Piazza Venezia acquired more relevance.11 This meant
that the Roman aristocracy was now even more interested in the urban
development of Rome, as most of the properties of the established noble
Roman families were located in those areas.
It is in this climate that the local council, concerned about the stagnation
of building activity since 1873, re-approached the government to obtain
state-backed financial help. This action, begun in 1877, eventually led to
the approval of two laws in 1881 and 1883 intended to have an enormous
impact on the direction and features of building activity during the 1880s.
The provision of these two bills thus plays an important role in our
story, but before moving on to the analysis of the process leading to their
approval, it is worth turning our attention to some of the dynamics taking
place during the same years at the macroeconomic level, as their impact
proved to be equally fundamental.
9 According to Della Seta, still in 1913, 11 families belonging to the aristocracy owned 40%
of land in Rome. Della Seta, ‘La speculazione edilizia’.
10 Caracciolo, Roma capitale, 146–54.
11 According to Vidotto, this change in mentality is most visible in the decision, in 1882,
to locate the funeral monument to King Vittorio Emanuele II in the area around Piazza
Venezia, a decision that would change the profile of a zone previously regarded as being
on the margins of urban refurbishment. Vidotto, Roma contemporanea, 72–4.
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Boom and bust: 1880–90
The emergence of new directions and ideas about the future of Rome
took place at the same time as the country was inundated by financial
resources of both national and international origin. In particular, since the
early 1880s the supply of money had increased dramatically as a result of
the reintroduction of the gold standard, and of the massive international
gold loan (644 million lira) which came with it, as well as a much more
expansive policy implemented by the banks of issue.12 In the still relatively
backward Italian economy, however, growing investment opportunities
did not match increased credit availability. Speculation on real estate
became an extremely attractive business and the financial sector began
to look to Rome once more. However, while during the 1970s only a few
banks had established their presence in Rome, this time virtually all north
Italian commercial banks (supportedbymost of the banks of issue) decided
on a significant level of engagement with the Roman market. Among the
most active, therewas a network of companies organized by the influential
Piedmontese banker Ulrico Geisser. He owned his personal bank and, by
means of exchange of financial holdings, sharing of board members, and
mutual credit and business, he managed to create a web of companies
which included the Compagnia Fondiaria, the Banca Tiberina (and its
financial backer, the Banco di Sconto e Sete), the Societa` dell’Esquilino,
and the building company Marotti & Frontini.13 Between 1879 and 1887,
this network operated in a collusive oligopoly together with the Societa`
Generale Immobiliare (sponsored by themost important commercial bank
of the time, the CreditoMobiliare), and a trust made of the Banca Generale
(the othermain commercial bank of the county) and the building company
Societa` Veneta di Costruzioni.14 Local financial institutions were almost
non-existent, and,with the exception of theRomanbankof issue (the Banca
Romana), we can say that themoney that fostered the building speculation
came from northern and central Italy.15 To give an idea of themagnitude of
this business, it has been estimated that in 1887 about 1,100million lirawere
invested in Rome, an amount equivalent to about 25 per cent of total assets
owned that year by all commercial banks, saving and loans institutions
12 Details about the impact of the return to the gold standard on the Italian economy and the
problems ofmoney issuing can be found inM. Fratianni and F. Spinelli,AMonetary History
of Italy (Cambridge, 1997), and G. Toniolo, An Economic History of Liberal Italy: 1850–1918
(London, 1990).
13 SeeP.DiMartino, ‘L’esito fallimentarediun interventodiultima istanza; laBancanazionale
e i salvataggi del 1889’, Imprese e Storia, 24 (2001), 307–36.
14 Contemporary observers were aware of this fact. In 1890, the economist Valenti described
the monopolistic character of the Roman estate market. See G. Valenti, ‘A proposito della
crisi edilizia nella citta` di Roma’, Il Giornale degli Economisti, 5 (1890), 314–32.
15 Despite their names (Tiberina comes from the name of the river Tiber, and Esquilino is a
quarter of Rome) the Banca Tiberina as well as the Societa` dell’Esquilinowere by nomeans
local enterprises. In fact, they operated locally, but only as appendices of the Turin banking
system; the capital and board of directors came from Piedmont.
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and co-operative banks.16 In fact, national banks did not necessarily use
only their own capital and often operated as bridges for foreign financial
institutions. As Bocci noted, re-discount of commercial bills was the most
common practice, as it established links among different types of banks
(local institutions, national banks and banks of issue), and often French or
Swiss institutions turned out to be the final destination of these bills.17 Of
the 1,100 million lira mentioned above, about 300 probably came from this
channel.18 The Turin-based network organized by Ulrico Geisser, whowas
himself of Swiss origin, certainly relied on this mechanism.19
Banks andvarious companies operating on theRoman real estatemarket
relied on two main types of business. First, big companies linked to the
banks (such as the Marotti & Frontini or the Societa` Veneta) obtained
lucrative contracts to erect buildings on behalf of the Roman municipal
council. Second, banks bought large extensions of land to be divided and
sold, at comparatively high prices, to a plethora of small local building
companies. These agents were themselves engines of speculation as their
growing demand for land, based on the expected increase in the value
of housing, kept prices rising. This factor in itself shows the intrinsically
fragile nature of the business, as expectations about increasinghouseprices
were not based on sustainable ‘real’ demand.20 Furthermore, most of the
time banks dealt with small companies notorious for their lack of technical
competence, managerial skills and financial stability. Nonetheless, banks
were keen to provide such companies with the working capital they
desperately needed.21 It is already clear that banks andfinancial companies
were playing an extremely risky game but, at least for a while, it seemed
to pay off. From 1879 onwards, the price of land and buildings rose
dramatically, to reach a peak between 1886 and mid-1887. Data is patchy,
but according to the few available sources in a matter of a few years
prices increased by between 2,000 and 200,000 per cent depending on
the areas.22 Qualitative descriptions by contemporary observers are even
more dramatic than numbers: plots of land both inside and outside the
16 Caracciolo, Roma capitale, 196.
17 M. Bocci, ‘Banche e edilizia a Roma fra Otto e Novecento’, Roma Moderna e Contemporanea,
7 (1999), 125–46.
18 Caracciolo, Roma capitale, 196.
19 In a letter to Prime Minister Crispi, Geisser explicitly admitted that the Turin banking
system found support ‘in its old relationship with France’. Archivio Centrale dello Stato
(ACS), Fondo Crispi (FC) fs. 255, letter from Geisser to Crispi, 27 Jul. 1889 (author’s
transltion).
20 As Caracciolo explained, the growing working and lower middle classes demanded
relatively cheap accommodations, while building companies mainly erected luxury villas.
See Caracciolo, Roma capitale, 195.
21 The banks’ risky behaviour was criticized by contemporary observers such as the famous
economist Vilfredo Pareto. See V. Pareto, ‘L’Italie e´conomique’,Revue des DeuxMondes, 107
(1891), 904–44.
22 See Caracciolo, who used data provided by various contemporary sources (Caracciolo,
Roma capitale, 187). Data on land price in Rome during the period under investigation has
been provided also by Della Seta, ‘La speculazione edilizia’.
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city walls became the target of speculators and the ‘building fever’ (as
contemporaries called it) hit Rome, which was soon transformed into a
giant building site.23 Companies showed nomercy for historical buildings
and artistic structures: wherever possible, these were bought and sold
at the maximum price, ancient woodland transformed into residential
properties and historical quarters demolished and rebuilt in an orgy of
speculation with no rules and direction.24
The crash, however, was as spectacular as the boom; suddenly in
November 1887 credit became scarce and financial support for the Roman
market dried up.25 The result was that prices collapsed, and by the
early 1890s they were well below pre-1879 levels.26 This massive bust
left builders without work, companies on the verge of bankruptcy and
banks with huge non-performing credits (the so-called ‘stone bills’). At
the same time, the financial situation of the council of Rome was no
better: having dissipated the government funds as well as the capital
provided by a massive state-guaranteed loan (we return to the origin
and relevance of these elements later in the article), the council was on
the verge of bankruptcy. In 1889, the ‘nominal’ fiscal deficit reached 6
million lira. In 1890, PrimeMinister Crispi, whose antipathy for the Roman
aristocracy was notorious, forced the local administrators to resign and
appointed a commissario governativo (government comptroller) to be in
charge of the administration of the city. After having used the council’s
precarious financial conditions for his political purposes, Crispi bailed out
the council.27
The national parliament and the rebuilding of Rome
If the return to the gold standard and the renewed interest of international
financial markets in Italy provided the resources behind the speculation,
two laws passed in the early 1880s played amajor role in channelling these
resources towards the Roman market. Thus, the analysis of the process
leading to the approval of these two acts is crucial to understanding the
causes of the 1880s boom. In order to understand the details of this process,
it is necessary to look first at the wider issue of how different economic
23 See, among many others, Ferraris, ‘L’Italia e Roma’, 290–301.
24 Villa Boncompagni-Ludovisi, an old woodland in the heart of the city, is one of the most
famous examples. SeeM.G. Barberini (ed.),Rione XVI Ludovisi (Rome, 1981), and L. Ferretti
andF.Garofalo, ‘Unquartiere per la borghesia; lottizazione e costruzionediVilla Ludovisi’,
in Roma capitale 1870–1911. Architettura e urbanistica. Uso e trasformazione della citta` storica
(Venice, 1984).
25 In Nov. 1887, the mayor of Rome wrote to PrimeMinister Crispi to tell him that ‘in the last
few days’ credit in Rome had become scarce. ACS/FC b. 40-fasc. 250, letter from Torlonia
to Crispi, 22 Nov. 1887.
26 Data about land prices in Rome are extremely patchy but all sources indicate that the
collapse was dramatic. Information drawn from balance sheets of banks involved in
speculation, such as the Banca Tiberina or the Compagnia Fondiaria, supports this view.
See Di Martino, ‘L’esito fallimentare’.
27 See Caracciolo, Roma capitale, 210–34.
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interests were represented in the national institutions. In general, it is fair
to say that the lobbies most directly interested in relaunching building
activity in Rome had relatively little power. Banks’ interests found almost
no direct support in the 1880s national parliaments, whichwere composed
largely of rentiers and professionals whose attitude towards financial
businesses was, at best, neutral if not hostile.28 The position of Roman
landowners was not much better: their weight was limited and, to make
things worse, members of parliament had, in general, little sympathy for
Roman interests.29 However, by the time important laws were discussed
and approved the political front was extremely fragile and unstable. In
particular, the disappearance of the traditional boundaries between the
main two parties and the strong competition among individual politicians
for leadership created considerable opportunities for tactical alliances to be
formed in parliament. Roman interests thus had a much stronger impact
and room for manoeuvre than their quantitative weight would otherwise
have allowed them to have.
These issues emerged clearly during the long discussion ofwhat became
law n. 209, 20 May 1881.30 Through the provision of 50 million lira of
public funds and by giving the Roman council the opportunity to issue
bonds up to 150 million, this bill played a key role in the reactivation
of the Roman market. The core provisions of the law were the result of
an agreement reached between the national government and the Roman
council, eventually approved by the local government in November 1880.
Already at this level, it is clear that local economic interests managed
to exploit the instability of the political environment, instability which
mirrored, on a smaller scale, the situation at the national level.31 It is not
surprising that when the law was discussed in the national parliament the
same situation occurred again. In fact, before reaching parliament the law
was first analysed by a dedicated commission, and even at this stage the
Roman lobby achieved some important results.32 However, it was during
the actual parliamentary discussion that the law was shaped in the way
whichwasmost convenient toRoman interests. Specifically, the parliament
had to decide between two alternatives; the joint government–council
project or the one emended by the parliamentary commission. The two
plans shared two structural elements. First, the government committed
itself to offering a fund of 50 million lira for the redevelopment of Rome.
Second, as a condition of receiving the funds, the council was expected
to provide a rigid development plan with a clear indication of a series of
28 See A. Polsi, Alle origini del capitalismo Italiano. Stato, banche e banchieri dopo l’Unita` (Turin,
1993).
29 See Caracciolo, Roma capitale, ch. 7.
30 Hereafter referred to as ‘1881 law’.
31 Ciampani, Cattolici e liberali, 75–94.
32 A. Ciampani, ‘Politica nazionale e rappresentanza degli interessi: la legge per Roma
del 1881 nell’istruttoria parlamentare della camera dei deputati’, Rassegna Storica del
Risorgimento, 85 (1998), 483–504.
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buildings to be erected in specific areas. The buildings included in the plan
couldbe either structures consideredof ‘national interest’, such ashospitals
and military barracks, or of ‘local interest’ such as squares, bridges,
gardens, streets, etc. However, while the ‘national interest’ buildings
added no value to the areas in which they had to be located (in fact,
given their nature they were more likely to expect a devaluation), ‘local
interest’ buildings were fundamental in increasing the appeal of certain
areas, and consequently themonetary value of properties and land located
there. Therefore, decisions about where to build national structures as
well as the relative priority given to ‘local’ and ‘national’ issues could
have a huge impact on the real estate market. These were exactly the
issues which marked the divisions between the two projects; the one
provided by the parliamentary commission gave the national government
the power tomake suchdecisions,while the alternative plan favoured local
government. It must be noted that during the discussion somemembers of
parliament stressed the deficiencies of both plans, in particular the absence
of reliable estimates of the total costs of the project, of the time necessary
to complete it, as well as of a clear scale of priorities among buildings.
Given these circumstances, there was a serious risk of exhausting the
financial reserves of the council without reaching valuable results in
terms of realization of the plan. Pantaleoni, the uncompromising liberal
economist, stated: ‘We are discussing plans regarding many buildings
without presenting a stone, a project, anything establishing the bases and
conditions and, in the meantime, we are determining the price to pay.’33
However, despite widespread doubts, not only was the law eventually
approved but it also took the shape most favourable to Roman interests,
as the bill put the Roman local government, and not the national one, in
charge of strategic decisions such as the priority to be given to buildings,
as well as their location.
The approval of the 1881 law thus marked a first important victory for
the Roman lobby: state financial intervention was there to stimulate the
market, but the management of the plan was solidly in the hands of the
local government; thismeant that insiders had the chance todirect building
activity towards particular areas or structures in order to increase the value
of the land theyowned. The advantages of the 1881 act for theRoman lobby,
however, did not end here. In fact, the law also allowed the Roman council
to issue bonds of up to 150million lira over a period of ten years in order to
finance the works included in the bill. The importance of this aspect fully
emerged in 1883 when another bill was passed making the state guarantor
of the bonds issued by the Roman council.34 The parliamentary discussion
leading to the approval of the 1883 law shows the magnitude of the risk
that the government took as a consequence of the act. As Plebano – a
liberal and independent Piedmontese member of the parliament – pointed
33 Atti del Senato, 11 May 1881 (author’s translation).
34 Law 8 Jul. 1883, n. 1842. Hereafter referred to as ‘1883 law’.
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out, the state guarantee freed the local government from all financial risks
connected to the rebuilding of Rome. The formal guarantees given by the
local government, for example the promise to transfer income generated
by local tax to the national budget, would have been useless in case of
bankruptcy, as the state would have had to provide the local government
with other funds to compensate for the loss.35 In the process leading to the
approval of the 1883 law, the action of the Roman lobby is evident: faced
with the doubts coming from various directions about the soundness of
the state’s financial support, Roman members of parliament reacted and
in various occasions intervened to downplay the extent of the risk and to
stress the importance of the formal guarantees the state had given.36
The year 1883 is important also because it marked the approval of the
building plan which the 1881 law established as the necessary condition
for the Roman council to access the financial resources offered by the
state. The fact that the plan was provided two years after the approval of
the original law in itself demonstrates the lack of harmonization between
decisions taken at national and local level. There were, however, many
greater problems; in particular,while the structure of the building planwas
supposed to follow the direction of development decided upon as part of
the 1881 law, in fact it was substantially bent to accommodate previously
established local private interests. The best example is the inclusion
in the building plan of the aforementioned quarter under construction
at Prati di Castello.37
Thus, by 1883, the provision of the set of formal rules supposed to
regulate the rebuilding of Rome was completed, but it was far from
satisfactory. The building plan was characterized by a confusing schedule
and lack of information about the costs of various erections, and it was
also exposed to lobby pressure. On the other hand, the council was in
charge of its implementation, but the financial risk was ultimately borne
by the government. Even considering these elements, however, it is hard
to make complete sense of the features of the 1880s speculative bubble,
which certainly saw abuses perpetrated in the areas included in the plan
butwhichwasmainly relevant to areas excluded from it. In order to analyse
this issue, we need to turn our attention to the way in which rules decided
at national level were then implemented at the local level.
National laws in the local arena
It is important to understand what kind of institutions existed at local
level and how interests and lobbies operated within them. In Italy, local
35 Atti della camera dei deputati (ACD), 27 Jun. 1883.
36 See, for example, parliamentary speeches by two Romanmembers: Amadei and Simonelli
(ACD, 28 Jun. 1883).
37 On the discussion of the building plan in the local council and the attempts of speculators
to have the area of the Prati included in it, see Caracciolo, Roma capitale, 176–85.
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councils are composed of two distinct bodies, one with parliamentary
functions (the consiglio comunale) and another with a governmental role
(the giunta). In 1880s Rome, different groups had different levels of
representation in the various organizations. Since the 1880 local election,
and the progressive rise of the political party Unione Romana, landed
aristocrats, country merchants and lobbies interested in the increase of the
value of urban properties acquired positions of extreme power, facilitated
by conflicts and division inside the Sinistra Storica, the party in power
at the national level. This power, however, was never transformed into
a political monopoly, and a group of independent politicians with no
personal economic interests in the refurbishment of the city at least had
some voice.38 Even this voice, however, completely disappeared in the
giunta, whichwas simply the expression of the interests of the landowners
and their allies.
The northern Italian banks lobby, in general, had little direct
representation in local institutions. A few exceptions existed, as sometimes
members of theRomanelitewere alsomembers of the boards of directors of
banks. These links were relatively rare, although often strategic. To restrict
our attention to theGeisserweb described above, Renato Balestra,member
of the board of directors of the Compagnia Fondiaria – a company deeply
involved in the speculation – became a member of the municipal council
in 1885. In his role of assessore all’edilizia,39 he is recognized as having
started what was defined as a ‘huge building movement’.40 However,
whatever the extent and the relevance of these links, money was to be the
fundamental element that guaranteed a solid alliance between the Roman
elite and the financial world: local aristocrats and their allies owned the
land, but they had no working capital and they desperately needed the
support of the banks.41
The lobby composed of local interests and northern bankers thus had
considerable, but not full, political control over the local institutions and
still faced the issue of how to deal with national laws, in particular with
the limitations imposed by the building plan. Ironically, however, the
building plan was very clear about what to do in the areas which were
included in it, but said practically nothing about the rest. Specifically, no
building activity was explicitly authorized outside the borders of the plan,
but it was not forbidden either. Speculators saw this gap in regulation,
bought cheaper plots of land not considered by the plan, built unregulated
houses and palaces and eventually asked the council to make these new
boroughs legal and official. Such requests could have easily been refused
38 See Ciampani, Cattolici e liberali, for a detailed reconstruction of the representation of
political interests in the Roman council up to 1883.
39 In Italian municipal councils, assessorati are the equivalent of local ministries. The
assessorato all’edilizia is in charge of regulating and promoting building activities.
40 Archivio Storico Capitolino (ASC), Atti del Consiglio Comunale (ACC), meeting 18 Dec.
1885, p. 524.
41 See, among others, Della Seta, ‘La speculazione edilizia’.
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and further problems in the future avoided. In fact, the council’s attitude
was the opposite: not only were all new buildings approved, but the
council also offered to provide at its own expense public services such
as running water and sewage disposal. As in the 1870s, these deals were
regulated by convenzioni, which during the 1880s were widely used to
give a superficial formal cover to irregular businesses. Considering how
expensive these contracts were for the local administration, the attitude of
the council is puzzling. However, the reasons why the local government
accepted such inconvenient contracts can be easily understood by looking
at both sides of the transaction, keeping in mind that Roman land owners
were solidly in control of the council. On the demand side, the convenzioni
were convenient to banks and companies belonging to the northern Italian
lobby – which bought many plots of land outside the boundaries of
the building plan – whose involvement kept the speculation going and
property values increasing.On the supply side,manyproperties belonging
to Roman land owners had not been included in the building plan and the
convenzioni became an instrument to ensure their development.42
The convenzione was just one of the possible instruments in the hands
of the local lobby used to foster speculation. In fact, the Roman elite also
owned most of the properties inside the official building plan and had
to find out how to sell them at the highest possible price. The solution
was eased by the loophole in the 1881 law, which fixed no clear criteria
to establish the price of the land and buildings to be bought by the
council in order to be destroyed and rebuilt. In fact the 1881 law simply
confirmed what a previous law of 1865 had already established: in case of
expropriation, indemnitieswere determined between owners and the local
government depending on market prices. If we consider that members
of the council were very often also landowners, the assessment can be
regarded as just an internal business transaction between a small group
of people who at the same time represented both demand and supply.
In reading the official Roman council records between 1881 and 1887, it
is very easy to find endless discussions about the exaggerated price paid
by the council for plots of land or buildings in the city.43 Ironically, every
time some members of the local council were directly involved in the
sale,44 they abandoned the council room in order to demonstrate their
42 For example Villa Torlonia, Villa Sciarra al Gianicolo and Villa Boncompagni-Ludovisi. All
these three woodlands, not originally included in the official development plan of the city,
became centres of extensive building activity.
43 In Mar. 1883, for example, some council members polemically remarked how some small
houses in Via Monte Tarpeo which were bought by the council for more than 46,000 lira
proved to be worth much less (ASC/ACC, meeting 2 Mar. 1883). In Jul. 1884, a council
member criticized the plan to build a barracks close to a cemetery, where land was more
expensive and ‘against any practices of sound administration’. ASC/ACC, meeting 4 Jul.
1884, p. 11 (author’s translation).
44 According to a contemporary source, in 1884 and in the period between November
1885 and May 1886, the following members of the council owned properties bought
by the council (price paid in lira noted in parentheses): Bracci Andrea (37,000),
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incorruptibility, and only a few independent members denounced the
scandal. Contracts were invariantly approved. As the local newspaper
Il Messaggero thundered after the boom was over: ‘For many years council
members with no houses or land to be expropriated could be counted on
the fingers of one hand; we must add that council members of that time
were not egoists: they had brothers, nephews, friends.’45
Put this way, this development could simply look like an everyday story
of corruption and conflict of interest. In fact, the whole mechanism was
more sophisticated than might be expected. High prices paid for land
were beneficial to local land owners, but also detrimental to banks which
had to buy the land in order to then resell it at the highest possible price
to small building companies. The support of financial companies was
fundamental to the stability of the enterprise, and the Roman elite could
not run the risk of alienating the sympathy of the northern Italian banks
by overinflating the price of land available for purchase. The council had
therefore to find a way of ‘killing two birds with one stone’, in other
words of protecting the interests of both the local elite (i.e. keeping land
prices high) and the banks. The solution was, indeed, a very ingenious
one. Once the local government owned the land (bought at a very high
price from local landowners), it was sold in big plots. Because buying a
big plot of land was a considerable endeavour, only a few companies and
bankswere able to do it, therefore competition decreased and so did prices.
Furthermore, agreements between the few companies involvedwere quite
common, with the result that prices were pushed even further down.46 In
other words, the council bought at high prices and sold at low ones. At
first glance, this policy looks suicidal for financial stability but, as stressed
above, the council reliedon the 150million lira loan the statewasultimately
responsible for. Therefore, the risk of bankruptcy was not a real concern
for the local government, whose members were much more interested in
keeping the speculation going. Again, the local council records are full of
petitions presented and debates held by the few uncorrupted members of
the administration but, invariably, no alternative solutions were found.
Bypassing national laws was only one of the strategies the local lobby
could rely on. On other occasions, instead of exploiting the gaps in the
Boncompagni-Ludovisi Rodolfo (66,000), the Duke Cesarini-Sforza (130,000), Gui
Giovanni (46,000), Libani Alessandro (162,000), Querini Querino (390,000); Boncompagni
Ludovisi Rodolfo (240,000), Torti Benedetto (68,300), Trocchi Luigi (34,964), Silenzi
Giovanni (74,794), Corsini Andrea (150,000), Aldobrandini Camillo (30,828) and Giorgi
Nicola (34,000). See Comune di Roma, Note e stato dell’espropriazioni fatte dal Comune di
Roma per l’esecuzione del Piano Regolatore dal 1◦ novembre 1885 a tutto il 31 maggio 1886
(Rome, 1886). Leopoldo Torlonia, mayor of Rome since 1881, sold the Roman council a
palace to be destroyed in order to allow the enlargement of Via Nazionale (ASC/ACC,
meeting 3 Aug. 1881).
45 See ‘Il Comune di Roma’, Il Messaggero, 5 Apr. (1890), quoted by Caracciolo, ‘Il comune di
Roma’, 283 (author’s translation).
46 As noted in a council meeting in 1885, ‘Often participants in auctions agree on let[?] the
land being assigned to one of them at beggarly price, subsequently sharing the profits.’
ASC/ACC, meeting 20 Apr. 1885, p. 449 (author’s translation).
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national law, the local government simply interpreted them in a creative
and convenient way. The implementation of the law of 15 January 1885
n. 2892 (the so-called Risanamento Napoli law) is a good case in point.
Approved in a rush as a consequence of a cholera epidemic in Naples,
the law was conceived in order to promote a major refurbishment of the
city, and to provide easy and cheap ways for land to be confiscated and
property rebuilt. In particular, the law fixed the price to be paid in the case
of expropriation as the average between the estimated market price and
the sum of the previous ten years’ rent. If rent contracts were not registered
(despite a legal obligation to do so) and therefore information about rent
revenues was not available, the fiscal value was applied instead, although
it was not clear whether or not it averaged with the market price. The
law established that these rules about the prices of expropriation could
apply not only to Naples, but also to the whole country. The appearance
of the 1885 law was a shock to the Roman lobby as the opportunity for
huge profits on compulsory sales was jeopardized by the new criteria
(in particular, rent contracts were rarely registered and fiscal values were
considerably below market prices). However, the council applied the law
in a very ‘creative’ way, thus reducing the impact of new criteria to zero.
In March 1885, after a harsh discussion, it was decided that in cases where
there was no information about rent, the fiscal value would be averaged
with the market price in order to determine the indemnity to be paid.
This was in itself a victory for landowners, considering that the council
officially committed itself to the goal of ‘reconciling public services needs
with reasonable private interests’.47 Even more importantly, however, the
council decided that the 1885 law should not be regarded as the rule but
applied ‘only in case of complaints’,48 that is only if someone complained
about the indemnity received. Of course, land proprietors were offered
high prices and had no reason to complain and it is not surprising that,
eventually, the law found very little application.
Dealing with the local opposition
Although the consiglio comunalewas solidly controlled by apro-speculation
lobby, sometimes too much was too much. The small ‘dissident’ side
had relatively little voice, but it could become very noisy, especially
when amplified by newspapers and reported to the national parliament.
Thus, operations such as buying and selling land to and from the local
government at absurd prices had to be done by adopting more discreet
tactics. The so-called acquisto delle aree laterali (purchase of lateral extensions
of buildings) is an interesting example of a tool used with the specific
aim of doing suspect deals without attracting too much attention. The
47 ASC/ACC, meeting 24 Mar. 1885, p. 383.
48 ASC/ACC, meeting 24 Mar. 1885, p. 383.
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mechanism relied on the fact that when it was necessary to buy a property
to be partially demolished in order to enlarge a street or a square, it was
sometimes more convenient to buy the whole building instead of only the
portion to be destroyed, as owners tended to overvalue the price of small
sections. In these cases, the law of 25 June 1865 n. 2359 authorized the local
government to exploit the option of buying whole buildings instead of
sections. In theory, this was a convenient option in specific cases but, over
time, the local government exploited it very widely and on a regular basis,
turning a money-saving instrument into a speculation-promoting device.
For example, in December 1885, in discussing the plan to purchase some
modest houses surrounding Via Cavour and Via dello Statuto the council
member Vespignani stated: ‘The system adopted by the giunta of making
very wide usage of the possibility of expropriating lateral extensions is not
fruitful and can turn into great disadvantage to the council . . . nowadays
we do not finish any public work without expropriating lateral extensions
and this can degenerate into abuse.’49
Given the attention that the abuse of this practice eventually attracted,
the local elite had to invent other ways to conduct suspect transactions in
a discreet manner. One of these devices consisted in transferring power
from the consiglio comunale to the giunta, where dissidents had no voice.
This option was authorized in case of very urgent business about which
the giunta could decidewithout waiting for a preliminary discussion in the
consiglio comunale. In these cases, the consiglio comunale could only ratify
decisions already taken. Urgency is, of course, a very relative concept,
and on more than one occasion the giunta spotted the opportunity of
approving directly and in a discreet way contracts which were suspect
rather than urgent. This happened, for example, in various instances
where land was sold in big plots in order to accommodate the needs
of financial companies,50 as well as in cases where the need to buy lateral
extensions of buildings was generously interpreted.51 The debate in the
consiglio comunale only followed and, despite the usual protests, most of
the time the damage had already been done.
Conclusions
As the saying goes ‘Rome was not built in a day’; indeed, it was built over
many days, months and years. The years between 1879 and 1887 saw an
attempt at modernization and development which ended up in massive
speculation with devastating consequences. Regeneration of some of the
49 ASC/ACC, meeting 18 Dec. 1885, pp. 524–6 (author’s translation).
50 For example, in July 1884 the giunta informed the consiglio comunale of the decision to sell
40,000 square metres of land in the Esquilino area (ASC/ACC, meeting 14 Jul. 1884).
51 In Jan. 1885, the giunta informed the consiglio comunale of the purchase of lateral extensions
of some buildings in Via Nazionale; the council member Amadei strongly criticized the
procedure as being not justified by any real urgency (ASC/ACC, meeting 12 Jan. 1885).
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historical areas was needed, as was refurbishment of traditional working-
class boroughs, and the provision of decent yet cheap housing for the
incoming flow of lower-middle-class ministry employees. Instead, by the
early 1890s, the city witnessed a paradox: an oversupply of expensive
buildings with no potential acquirers was combined with a mass of new
inhabitants with nowhere to live. All this came at the expense of taxpayers,
with severe consequences for the financial conditions of Roman local
government and the city’s future urban development.
The actions of a cohesive lobby made of the local elite and northern
Italian bankerswere behind this failure, but thiswas amuchmore complex
phenomenon than the story of corruption and triumph of private interest
over the public good would suggest. In fact, the local lobby had to fight
against strong opposition both at national and local level, aswell as dealing
with relativelyprecise regulation.However, the fragility of the institutional
environment, the depth of political divisions and the use of a variety of
ingeniousmechanisms allowed this lobby to ‘capture’ the institutions and,
as a consequence, bypass or ignore formal regulation.
This conclusion raises a legitimate counter-factual question: had
different formal and/or informal rules been in place would the results
have been less perverse? An answer to this question, although a rather
speculative one, can be provided by looking at the almost contemporary
examples of the urban regeneration of London and Paris. In both cases,
transformation occurred in a way which, although far from perfect,
never reached the excesses seen in Rome, and this was because the
incentives proved to be much more effective. In London, the massive
increase of population during the Victorian age forced the authorities
to rethink the problem of inner-city slums. The solution was found in
both the regeneration of some of the inner-city areas, as well as in the
development of suburbs, and in an approach based primarily on private
initiative and market-based principles subject to few but very effective
rules. In the city centre, the elimination of a number of overcrowded
slums and the erection of new buildings was made possible by the
fact that the vast amount of money collected by various philanthropic
organizations was to some extent invested in companies that built ‘model
dwellings’ for the urban working class providing a 5 per cent interest.
Although this experiment was criticized in the traditional historiography,
its effectiveness has been reasserted in more recent studies.52 In this
regard, it is important to stress that although this operation was mainly
the result of the virtuous combination of Victorian philanthropic ideals
and the strength of market forces, the state provided light but essential
regulation by allowing building companies to borrow at preferential rates
and by legally obliging them to build working-class houses in areas where
52 S. Morris, ‘Market solutions for social problems: working-class housing in nineteenth-
century London’, Economic History Review, 54 (2001), 525–45.
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slums had been demolished.53 A similar combination of private initiative
and light-touch regulation is visible in the erection and refurbishment
of working-class suburbs. In these cases, speculative builders simply
exploited the advantages of cheaper land and worked economically to
providedwellingswhich, howevermodest anddull,were affordable andat
least respected some basic regulations in terms of minimum dimensions.54
Overall, the example of London certainly does not represent an ideal case
of urban redevelopment; both the ‘model dwelling’ movement and the
refurbishment of suburbs proved to be of limited impact, and certainly by
the beginning of the twentieth century the problem of overcrowding was
far from resolved. On the other hand, however, at least some improvement
in the living conditions of working-class Londoners was achieved and this
without any of the problems which occurred in Rome.
If it was a market-based approach subject to light regulation which
in London avoided the excesses seen in Rome, in Paris in 1850–70, the
same result was reached via the opposite solution, represented by the
provision of a complex and systematic set of official rules and enforcement
mechanisms. Specifically, an external authority (the prefecture) accountable
to another power (the emperor)was in charge of co-ordinating the building
planwhile the council had only limited power andwas also accountable to
the emperor. This structure first of all limited the risk of possible conflicts
of interests, among council members, when deciding on the priority to be
given to various works. Also, council members had no tools to increase
the value of indemnities to be paid for compulsory acquisition of land
and building. Without the allure of personal monetary gains on the one
hand, and accountability to other powers on the other, council members
had sufficient incentive to concentrate their attention on the soundness
of the local budget. The incentive to take a prudential approach was
further reinforced by the fact that the council, rather than the prefect,
had the power to decide whether or not to float loans to finance the
local expenses, and no state guarantee was contemplated. Indeed, the
council tried to keep expropriations price low and, and the same time,
to resell ‘lateral extensions’ of expropriated buildings or land at the
highest price possible.55 The difference from Rome, where the council
bought at high prices and sold at low ones using a whole set of informal
instruments, could not be clearer. In practice, the institutional structure in
charge of urban transformations in Paris was based on a balance between
different centres of power and decisions, limiting problems of conflict of
interest. It must be said that, despite all this, the Paris experiment was far
from being a success: expropriation prices nonetheless increased and the
council finances deteriorated. However, the historiography on this subject
53 A.S. Wohl, The Eternal Slum. Housing Policy in Victorian London (London, 1977), 144–5.
54 Ibid., 285–316.
55 A. Sutcliffe, The Autumn of Central Paris. The Defeat of Town Planning 1850–1970 (London.
1970).
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claims that this result had little to do with the presence of mechanisms
similar to the ones that operated in Rome two decades later. In fact, the
situation was the result of a human mistake rather than the outcome of an
institutional failure. Haussmann’s idea was that rapid urban development
would have increased the city’s wealth and the council’s revenues before
the rise of asset price could make the costs connected to the plan (i.e.
expropriation indemnities) too high. Haussmann’s prediction, however,
failed to materialize.56
When compared to London and Paris, the example of Rome thus shows
that the tendency of private interests to degenerate into excesses may be
a feature of any urban development, but also that sound institutions can
stop these interests from prevailing.
56 Ibid.
